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IN THIS FORUM, Elisa Arnaudo, Lisa Bortolotti & 
Martino Belvederi Murri, Amy Kind and Paul 
Noordhof introduce new challenges and offer 
corrections, ideas, qualifications and necessary 
connectives for my previous article. Each 
responder found something to agree with about its 
motivation, and/or conclusions, directing their 
valuable, detailed commentary to the reasoning on 
the basis of which those conclusions were drawn. 
To guide readers, I begin this rejoinder with a 
brief summary of my discussion and the areas 
within it which received sustained attention from 
my commentators (here noted in italics). 
 
█  1 Summary 
 
My own work on imagined pain was prompted 
by Kant’s attribution of delusional status to the 
melancholic’s misery based on analogy with the 
mistaken beliefs of the hypochondriac. To 
challenge that analogy, it seemed helpful to 
consider whether experiences of pain and 
suffering could be either hallucinatory, or even 
entirely imaginary. Dissatisfied with the findings 
of Reuter and colleagues about hallucinated pain, I 
pursued the second, refining different ways of 
imagining and developing an impossibility thesis 
(pain feelings are impossible to imagine) 
employing the contrast between imagining pain 
and re-experiencing as painful flashbacks. 
Accounts of imagining were tested to explain and 
support the impossibility thesis (Brann’s, those 
centered on raw feels, and Dellantonio and 
Pastore’s on experience of inner perception).1 
Commentators (particularly Kind and Noordhof) 
have required me to reconsider each aspect of this 
progression, including my dismissal of the empirical 
work on pain hallucinations; the details of the 
impossibility thesis; the basic contrast between 
imagining pain and pain flashbacks, and each 
explanation I introduced of the impossibility thesis.  
Complicating this discussion was the contrast 
between the “emotional” pain intended by Kant, 
and pain associated with tissue damage. My 
presumption that these two kinds of pain feelings 
were, if not indistinguishable, then closer than is 
usually recognized, was (I hoped) confirmed 
phenomenologically, using the flying knife and 
terrible news examples. Commentaries disagreed 
over the phenomenology (Kind) and drew attention 
to ambiguities in my position, either skirting, or 
setting aside the alignment between “emotional” and 
tissue-damage pain. Also complicating the 
discussion was my failure to endorse represent-
tational accounts of experience, instead allowing for 
the possibility of a simpler, internal ostension 
model of experience and of imagining. By contrast, 
commentators adopted the presuppositions of some 
form of representationalism (Bortolotti & Belvederi 
Murri, Noordhof).  
In continuing pursuit of Kant’s idea that 
painful feelings may be imaginary and so reflect 
“mere delusions of misery”, pain feelings were 
then considered using standard criteria for 
delusional beliefs. Criteria involving epistemic 
rationality were inapplicable here because they 
begged the question at issue, it was pointed out, 
and also because of the status of painful feelings as 
affections; although applicable, criteria involving 
procedural rationality were unhelpful because 
feelings of depressive pain were generally not 
incompatible with coherence-based norms. 
Imagination-focused, meta-cognitive criteria 
introduced by Currie and colleagues were 
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apparently applicable to our cases of emotional pain 
but depended on the miserable person imagining 
herself feeling pain – imaginings precluded as long as 
the impossibility thesis holds. The discussion here was 
addressed by Bortolotti & Belvederi Murri, who 
sketched an account of delusions which affirmed my 
conclusions about affective delusions without sharing 
my presuppositions, and redirected the discussion 
away from imagining.  
 
█  2 Arnaudo 
 
Arnaudo is sympathetic to the underlying 
motivation for my discussion, recognizing my 
reason to question the analogy Kant seems to 
draw between the melancholic’s felt distress and 
the hypochondriac’s imagined and imaginary 
disorder. Her approach takes the form of a 
thorough and persuasive account of the bias and 
dualistic assumptions underlying more than a 
century of medical and scientific analysis of those 
pains that cannot be readily ascribed to verifiable 
tissue damage. I greatly appreciate this way of 
providing historical background for what was 
bothering me, and illustrating why these matters 
are of importance that lies beyond their solely 
theoretical interest – why, as she says, the analysis 
of experiences of pain and suffering presents a 
task of considerable urgency.  
With revisions to three definitive accounts of 
pain during the present decade – the DSM-V 
(2013), the updated definition of pain from the 
IASP (2020), and ICD-11 (2020) – we have 
witnessed significant conceptual shifts. These 
were driven by acknowledgement of how little is 
yet understood about pain, especially pain without 
identifiable organic cause. They stressed the 
subject’s particular authority in describing pain 
experience (in the IASP and DSM5 definitions), 
and acknowledged (in ICD-11) the necessity of 
adopting a more phenomenological approach to 
these forms of suffering. Especially in light of the 
earlier definitions and attitudes from the second 
half of the twentieth century that Arnaudo 
documents, these recent revisions must be 
recognized as a welcome advance. Yet, as Arnaudo 
stresses, they still leave a tension between pain as 
experience and pain as objectively characterized. 
If the patient’s reported pain fails to match the 
organic evidence, epistemic challenges arise – he 
might lie, it is supposed, or be mistaken, 
exaggerate or misapprehend. Pain’s subjectivity is 
fundamentally at odds with the consistency, 
verifiability and replicability definitive of 
scientific method. These challenges are on display 
in the troubling history of the concept of 
“psychogenic” pain, it is illustrated. And revisions 
of that and related terms in DSM5 hardly help 
matters, beset as they are by vagueness that as well 
as being conceptually unsatisfactory seems likely 
to thwart effective diagnostic practices. 
Much of Arnaudo’s interest, in this and her 
other valuable empirical and theoretical work, is 
directed towards chronic pain (in such conditions 
as fibromyalgia), which she rightly identifies as the 
long-neglected and disparaged stepchild of pain 
science and classification. As her detailed survey 
makes clear, in the absence of identifiable lesions, 
chronic pain was all too often and for far too long, 
dismissed as psychogenic – and akin to depression. 
The sufferer was ushered towards psychiatry, 
where her condition went by “Hysteria” among 
other names, and ran the risk of being dismissed, or 
under-treated, as imagined and imaginary. 
As it is consistently portrayed, both in research 
and in first person report, the pain of chronic pain 
conditions is experienced phenomenally, or 
sensorially. Its symptoms may also include more 
emotional, affective states such as the depressive 
feelings with which it is closely associated. But 
primarily, it is depicted as a sensory state. Like 
Arnaudo, other commentators for the most part 
abjure the emotional pain of depression, whose 
status as sensorial remains uncertain, focusing 
instead on the clearly sensory pain associated with 
tissue damage that has been the subject of most 
philosophical research. 
I recognize the uncertainty attaching to 
analogies between tissue damage pain and the 
pain of extreme depression, and grant the 
insufficiency of my account’s reliance on links 
between the two. I am still reluctant to give up 
using “pain” to describe the suffering associated 
with severe depression. Pain from tissue damage 
has long been privileged in being considered 
paradigmatic of pain. But no definition of pain in 
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions can 
be achieved, it is also agreed. In light of that, it 
seems to me that accurate and non-figurative uses 
of “pain” may depend on a range of variously 
distributed and only partially overlapping 
features, some number of which are sufficient, but 
none necessary, for that description. If the 
resemblances between different kinds of painful 
suffering were sufficiently overlapping – as they 
clearly are among typical tissue-damage pain 
tokens – “pain” may even admit of several 
paradigms. Certainly the trend in pain science, 
exemplified in the 2020 diagnostic definition from 
ICD-11 (quoted by Arnaudo), confirms the 
inextricable ties between sensory and affective 
elements in pain. And although it has been 
persuasively argued that so-called “social pain” 
fails to achieve the status of “pain” literally 
understood, other forms of emotional pain might 
yet be found to do so.2 
I am in much agreement with Arnaudo and 
have little to add, except to point out that, already 
linked as they are with depression, chronic pain 




looser use of “pain” permitted in my discussion, 
which spans the suffering of the depressive and 
the pain from unidentifiable as well as identifiable 
tissue damage. As confirmation of this, I draw 
attention to the introduction of the concept of 
“nociplastic pain” that enters the ICD-11 
definition of Chronic Widespread Pain. 
Characterized as pain that «(1) arises from altered 
nociception despite (2) no clear evidence of actual 
or threatened tissue damage causing the activation 
of peripheral nociceptors or (3) evidence for 
disease or lesion of the somatosensory system 
causing the pain», nociplastic pain sounds as 
emotional as it is sensorial (IASP Taxonomy 2017 
– emphases added).  
 
█  3 Kind 
 
Kind helpfully separates loose from stricter 
senses of imagining pain, and challenges the 
impossibility thesis with cases of inaccurate and 
incomplete imagining. Similarly, she grants mixed 
states that might still be judged as imaginings even 
though they are at the same time re-experiencings. 
The general phenomenological picture of 
imagining is expanded and illuminated by these 
complexities, undoubtedly, as they are by Kind’s 
intriguing idea that imagining is an exercise that 
can be improved with practice. Nonetheless, I am 
left unsure whether these refinements provide 
entirely satisfying counter-examples against the 
impossibility thesis, at least as revised in light of 
other commentators’ refinements. That we can 
imagine pain, though not accurately or fully, 
seems undeniable, as does the fact that such 
variations and lacunae similarly accompany visual 
imagining. Still, I am not sure about Kind’s 
conclusion that even if we grant that our 
imagining cannot be wholly and perfectly accurate 
«[…] this would not mean that imagining pain can 
never be done in the strict sense». My lingering 
concerns involve the characterization of that strict 
sense and the analogy with visual imagining 
(about which I say more below). 
Kind separates a loose and rough approxi-
mation (of a painful sensation) and asks whether I 
might at least accept that loosely speaking, people 
can imagine pain. My answer: we can, of course, 
imagine much about the context in which the pain 
experience is situated (and imagine even our own 
pain from an observer’s perspective). And 
certainly, as the contrast between loose and strict 
imagining suggests, imagining of any kind can be 
expected to vary according to the specificity and 
detail of what is imagined. My aim in restricting 
my claim (to the impossibility of imagining P) was 
to exclude some of the looser and less precise ways 
of imagining by emphasizing that it is the hurt or 
painfulness itself – seemingly a single, simple 
apprehension, phenomenologically – that is 
unimaginable, when we engage in such an 
attempted exercise. Trying to imagine this way is, 
in Kind’s own words, trying to somehow bring 
ourselves to be in a state with the same qualitative 
feel as P1.  
To develop her position that we can do better 
and worse at imagining, Kind contrasts realistic 
and fantastical imaginings, where realistic 
imaginings «aim at accurate representation of 
their target». I take this distinction to match that 
employed by others, whose “recreative” would be 
Kind’s “fantastical” imagining. Still, I confess 
myself puzzled when this distinction is applied to 
imagining pain. Is it fantastical or realistic to try to 
imagine a pain-inducing context (such as the 
flying knife) complete with the painfulness itself? 
Also, because even non-fantastical imagining is 
not remembering but imagining, I wonder 
whether anything is lost if instead of introducing 
an accuracy standard, we say some imagining 
includes counterfactual elements, as Kind’s 
example of the study apparently illustrates.  
Moving in parallel ways to Kind, but grounded 
in representationalism, Noordhof shows that we 
will need to restrict the impossibility thesis to active 
and perhaps recreative imagining, and I return to 
that discussion below. But let me approach these 
proposed revisions by way of the dilemmic form 
Kind sees in my argument and sets herself to 
dismantle. Either we somehow bring ourselves to be in 
a state with the same qualitative feel as P1 or we 
don’t. If we do, then we’re re-experiencing, not 
imagining; if we don’t, then we’re not imagining. 
Kind challenges the exclusive dichotomy between 
imagining and re-experiencing here, speculating 
that re-experiencing may not be a case of merely 
imagining, but rather a hybrid case of “imagining 
plus experiencing”. In response to Kind’s 
conclusion, it must first be acknowledged that 
phenomenologically, re-experiencings (flashbacks, 
for example), likely include interwoven elements, 
some imaginative and others more memory-like. 
And this would be reason to restrict the 
impossibility thesis to counter-factual recreative 
imagining. But at least so restricted, the thesis 
seems to me to remain undefeated. 
Kind’s warning not to confuse “can’t imagine” 
with “won’t imagine” is interesting, not only 
because it evokes Gendler’s work but more 
immediately. It seems to anticipate the disposition 
to respond adversely, de-activated when one 
attempts to imagine pain in the requisite way, by 
which Noordhof proposes explaining the 
impossibility thesis. Kind’s phenomenologically-
grounded account presupposes a degree of 
conscious awareness and control, while 
Noordhof’s work need not, since it is focused, as 
he puts it, on the conditions for representing pain. 
Yet each rests on the idea of a natural aversive 
response to felt pain. 
Kant’s “mere delusions of misery”  
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█  4 Noordhof 
 
Noordhof rightly restricts the impossibility 
thesis to active imaginings, and I appreciate this 
clarification. His reasoning here explores pain 
hallucinations, empirical findings about which I 
had set aside in favor of a more directly 
phenomenological approach. We do not doubt that 
phantom limb pain hurts; if we were to grant that 
phantom limb pains are hallucinated pains, then we 
must allow it can be possible to imagine pain in the 
requisite way, he reminds us. Phantom limb pain, 
although some form of misapprehension, is not 
responsive to the will. So here is a second 
qualification to the impossibility thesis: it will be 
active imagining.  
After making clear that his revised version of 
the impossibility thesis applies only to sensuous 
imagining rather than to the more emotional pain 
associated with depression, Noordhof offers an 
alternative explanation of it to replace mine. A 
postulated disposition to respond adversely allows 
him to explain the impossibility thesis by appeal to 
basic intentional acts that inhibit or curb that 
response. (An intentionally basic action lacks 
(further) purpose: i.e., it is defined as one of doing 
A without it being the case that there is something 
distinct from A that one aims to do in virtue of 
which one does A). There can be non-basic actions 
that are imaginings, but the claim remains that 
(from the first-person perspective) it will be 
impossible to imagine pain as an intentionally 
basic act of imagination. This revision is 
introduced in the face of some potential 
challenges to the impossibility thesis from 
experimental findings, and conjectures over “sub-
intentional imaginings” by Jacob & de 
Vignemont,3 against which it does seem sufficient.  
Despite these persuasive ways of shoring up 
the impossibility thesis, Noordhof also introduces 
a counter-example designed to address my claim 
that our suffering as a consequence of imagining 
pain never reduces to imagining our suffering (in 
the requisite respects). A person imagines the 
terrible pain he would have felt when viewing a 
dying loved-one through hospital isolation 
restrictions, were he not at the time numbed beyond 
feeling. Certainly, this cannot be explained as 
remembering or re-experiencing, I agree with 
Noordhof. Yet it is possible, he insists, and is 
legitimately described as imagining the pain.  
I am puzzled by certain details. If the same 
imagining were entirely conjectural: imagining 
one’s suffering as it would have been had one been 
placed in the position of so many others during 
Covid even though one never was so placed, why 
is this less persuasive? If one were numbed at t1 in 
Noordhof’s case, only to try to imagine 
retrospectively at t2, what part is played by the 
ghostly blocked feeling at t1? This is not the first 
time we’ve felt pain, and the exact feeling related 
to that sad context is not felt at t1. Without further 
explanation of what makes this a rare 
counterexample for the impossibility thesis, 
Noordhof seems to invite a flood of challenges 
affecting all hypothetical recreative imaginings of 
one’s own pain that jeopardizes his own as well as 
my version of the thesis.  
While his counterexample may be in some 
doubt, however, or I may have misunderstood his 
intent with it, I gratefully accept several of the 
qualifications that strengthen the impossibility 
thesis. In the third part of his paper, Noordhof 
reflects on ways a flawed imagination might 
accompany the sufferings of depression, whether 
or not any version of the impossibility thesis holds 
up. His examples remind us of medieval and early 
modern accounts of mental suffering, where 
disorders such as Melancholy were widely 
attributed to dysfunctional, diseased, excessive or 
insufficient imagination. In an effort to track the 
dysfunction that might ensue from imaginings 
around felt pain Noordhof sketches pains non-
basically imagined that foster anxieties, negative 
attitudes and other depressive symptoms. Some of 
these may also come unbidden, he points out 
(sounding very like Burton in the Anatomy of 
Melancholy).4 They require an effort to dispel 
them that is missing in the akratic melancholic’s 
miserable frame of mind. Such unbidden 
imaginings will lack the element of control that 
allows the extinguishing of the aversive element, 
as well. I am grateful for each of these valuable 
examples of the way flaws affecting the 
imagination might dog the melancholic. In being 
likely made worse by failures of agency, as 
Noordhof recognizes, they are consistent with a 
great deal of literature about depressive 
phenomenology and its effects.  
Although basic acts of imagining pain are 
impossible, Noordhof speculates that there might 
be a kind of extended delusional belief about one’s 
pain resulting not from directly imagining it, but 
from imagining for the purpose of apprehending 
some further imaginative content. The illustrative 
case involves visual imagining, where imagining 
the house enables us to indirectly (non-basically) 
imagine the number of its windows. That it is 
possible to visually imagine in this indirect way I do 
not doubt. But the analogy with visual imagining 
may be problematic. Visual imagining is complex 
(perhaps, as Brann proposes, due to its triadic 
structure). In comparison, sensory imagining 
comprises a limited range of phenomenal 
properties. We might better avoid the complexities 
of visual imagination by seeking an example of the 
purposeful direct imagining of something else out 
of which imagined pain inadvertently reveals itself.  
This proves not without difficulty, when it 




of injury or bodily damage so immediately and 
forcefully evokes the pain it would cause that the 
expected pain seems ineluctably tied to the 
imagining – not an unintended consequence – and 
this gets us back to the flying knife. An example 
can perhaps be adapted from Kind’s discussion. 
Suppose, she says, we imagine P1 not by 
visualizing oneself with a grimace and clenched 
fists (from the outside) but rather by imagining 
the qualitative feel of the grimace and clenched 
fist. This could invoke the feel of the pain itself, 
Kind and Noordhof would each agree. And if it 
does, then it supports Noordhof’s distinction 
between the basic and non-basic imagining that 
requires him to further restrict the impossibility 
thesis. (Noordhof’s separation between basic and 
non-basic imagining is readily applied to the case 
of depressive suffering, it should be noted. My 
reflection on a holiday my friend and I were to 
take had her illness not prevented it, will likely 
lead me to the painful recognition that my friend 
has since become entirely bedridden).  
The relationship between pain and other sense 
modalities is postulated by Noordhof at the outset. 
One plausible condition, he says, is that all sense 
modalities have similar phenomenal character 
constituted by the phenomenal properties of their 
respective states or events. Based on that, 
comparisons with visual experience and imagining 
are employed: when (i) it is stated that imagined 
pain must hurt but need not hurt as much as felt 
pain, just as imagined green need not be as vivid as 
(veridically) seeing green; (ii) direct and indirect 
imagining is illustrated using the example of 
imagining the sight of the house directly in order 
to learn the number of windows (indirectly) and 
(iii) being able to visually imagine an object’s 
being phenomenally red is said to be compatible 
with not being in a state of visually experiencing 
an object that is phenomenally red.  
I find neither of the first two of these entirely 
compelling comparisons, and am not sure that I 
fully understand the third. With (i), we can 
disengage the degree of vividness of green from 
the sight of it, whether actual or imagined; yet for 
me, at least, it is not possible to separate its 
qualitative aspects such as its intensity from the 
pain (actual or imagined) in the same way. 
Because its qualities are thus inexorably tied to its 
painfulness, this seems to me to illustrate the 
distinctive aspect of visual experience that Brann 
attributes to its triadic nature. I explained my 
somewhat similar difficulty with (ii) above. Parts of 
pain don’t seem able to be disambiguated 
phenomenologically the way parts of a visual field, 
real or imagined, are. Far from ignoring the 
dissimilarities between sensuous imagining and 
perceptual imagining, Noordhof has in earlier work 
emphasized them.5 Other difficulties, addressing 
which would be beyond the scope of the present 
discussion, nonetheless seem to him to leave a 
representationalist approach preferable to others, 
including what he describes as the Dependency 
Thesis (imagining involves imagining an 
experience) not ruled out in my discussion. 
 
█  5 Noordhof vs. Kind 
 
Slippage can occur between “I can’t” and “It 
[imagining pain], can’t be done,” Kind warns. And 
with his collection of corrections, elaborations and 
presuppositions in place, Noordhof accepts that the 
impossibility (it can’t be done) applies across the 
normal population. Some with mental disorder may 
have to be exempted from that generalization. 
Arguably, for example, people who suffer 
flashbacks following trauma constitute a group 
whose defect resides in their disposition to 
respond adversely. Due to the trauma, that 
disposition has been disabled, at least temporarily. 
Some recent theorizing has proposed that the 
flashback sufferer began so relatively advantaged 
on the normal range of visualization abilities that 
he is prevented from achieving what others may 
succeed at blocking.6 But this is quite compatible: 
flashbacks may occur in super-visualizers 
possessing a trauma-wrought mechanism that 
disables of the disposition to respond adversely.  
Combined with Noordhof’s analysis this 
account leaves re-imaginings of pain in the realm 
of disability. By contrast, on this generalization 
over what is within the normal range, Kind is 
doubtful, raising the possibility of (normal) 
individual variation in the ability to imagine 
painful feelings, and citing persuasive data from 
Ogini and colleagues to support her position.7 
Evidence of such a range of abilities in pain 
imagining, corresponding to the individual 
variation in imaginative capabilities across other 
sensory modalities, would put an end to the pain 
“exceptionalism” underlying my discussion. (I do 
not mean to suggest that this exceptionalism is 
necessarily absolute. Certainly Noordhof points to 
the case in favor of our ability to imagine smells, 
for example. Yet even if, as Brann and others have 
argued, visual, auditory (and even perhaps 
olfactory) ones do not, some sensory modes may 
possess features identified here as characteristic of 
pain.) It would also support the view, shared by 
several of these responses, and discussed above, 
that pain experience is strongly analogous to other 
forms of perception. That said, the direct evidence 
for the variable abilities with pain awareness is far 
from complete, as Kind acknowledges. And as I 
have suggested above, the comparative simplicity 
and phenomenological integrity of pain 
experience still seem to me to work against some 
of the strong analogies drawn here between 
experiencing pain and seeing (Noordhof ((i)-(iii) 
above), and Kind’s imagining her transformed 
Kant’s “mere delusions of misery”  
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workspace, and spouse’s face.) From the 
variability observed with visualization, I am 
reluctant to assume that pain imagining exhibits a 
comparable range. 
 
█  6 Bortolotti & Belvederi Murri 
 
Bortolotti & Belvederi Murri explore the 
sensory and perceptual components of pain to 
provide persuasive supporting arguments towards 
the conclusion they and I share, while electing to 
set aside Kant’s idea (as well as Currie and 
associates’ metacognitive one) that the failing in 
delusory ideas involves the imagination. While 
agreeing that we should resist the idea of 
delusional pain, Bortolotti & Belvederi Murri 
question that “an object needs to be imagined to 
be the object of a delusion”. Instead, they conclude 
that a characteristic epistemic irrationality carries 
most weight in support of the conclusion that pain 
experience eludes status as delusional – pains are 
simply not appropriate objects for epistemic 
evaluation.  
On the relation between imaginability and 
being a delusion, I should begin with what I 
interpret to be Kant’s position based on his 
analogy with hypochondria. Delusions are belief-
like products of the faculty of the imagination and 
may be, as “merely imaginary,” non-veridical. It 
was from this conception of delusion that I 
proceeded to consider whether unimaginability 
might be an indication of delusionality. In 
contrast, stating that “pain is fundamentally a 
sensory and perceptual experience,” Bortolotti & 
Belvederi Murri direct the discussion away from 
the questions of imaginability and the imaginative 
faculty raised by Kant. Their view: «one cannot 
have experiences of pain that are not veridical or 
verified or falsified by an external observer».  
These suppositional differences may leave us 
too divergent in basic assumptions for a direct 
exchange. Thus, Bortolotti & Belvederi Murri 
assume the impossibility of non-veridical 
experiences of pain. But that assumption is what 
lies at the heart of (my reading of) Kant’s analogy 
between the melancholic and hypochondriac. If 
the melancholic is capable of errors analogous to 
those of the hypochondriac, then non-veridical 
experiences of pain remain possible. It was for that 
reason that my discussion dismissed appeal to 
some epistemic rationality norms as question-
begging.  
Helpfully, Bortolotti & Belvederi Murri 
suggest that suffering such as the melancholic’s 
misery may result from patients mislabeling a 
“subjective experience which shares features with 
actual physical pain.” This points towards some 
recent speculation about the misapprehensions 
associated with Alexithymia, where the subject is 
said to suffer a deficit in identifying «physical 
sensations as somatic manifestations of 
emotions» so as to be susceptible to «incorrectly 
interpreting their emotional arousal as signs of 
disease» and so confusing “mental” with “physical” 
pain.8 While this interpretation remains possible, 
another one suggests itself: with their reference to 
activation of brain areas that occur «when one 
experiences reactive emotions due to other 
causes» Bortolotti & Belvederi Murri may be seen 
to support a more expansive reading of “pain,” 
even if the patient’s resulting misapprehensions 
would not rise to the level of delusional states. 
Much rests on one term, “resembling,” in the 
definition of pain by Raja and colleagues quoted 
with apparent approval by Bortolotti & Belvederi 
Murri («An unpleasant sensory and emotional 
experience associated with, or resembling that 
[experience] associated with, actual or potential 
tissue damage».9 Emotional feelings may not 
directly resemble either bodily pain or actual or 
potential tissue damage, yet still they may be 
associated with, or resemble, feelings associated 
with such tissue damage. Perhaps this is an 
acknowledgement of the ineluctably emotional 
aspect of pain, noted in recent definition revisions, 
and may be interpreted to include states of pain 
more emotional than sensorial.  
While rightly emphasizing that to avoid the 
attribution of delusional status congruence alone is 
not sufficient, Bortolotti & Belvederi Murri 
confirm the congruence that frequently unites 
thoughts and actions within the depressive frame of 
mind, noted in my discussion. As long as pain is 
restricted to signaling bodily damage or ideas of 
disease or lesions, I would agree that such a 
criterion is a non-starter for depression – unless, 
were that “resembling” of Raja and colleagues’ 
interpreted loosely enough, the pain of depression 
could be captured in reference to representations of 




To conclude: for each of these meticulous and 
fruitful responses, my debts and gratitude to Elisa 
Arnaudo, Lisa Bortolotti, Martino Belvederi Murri, 
Amy Kind and Paul Noordhof are immeasurable, as 
they are to the editors of this journal. 
 
█  Notes 
 
1 Cf. E. BRANN, The world of imagination: Sum and 
substance; S. DELLANTONIO, L. PASTORE, Internal 
perception. The role of bodily information in concepts and 
word mastery. 
2 Cf. J. CORNS, The social pain posit. 
3 P. JACOB, F. DE VIGNEMONT, Vicarious experiences: 
Perception, mirroring or imagination?. 
4 Cf. J. RADDEN, Melancholic habits: Burton’s anatomy 
and the mind’s sciences. 






6 C. ZIMMER, Many people have a vivid “mind’s eye” 
while others have none at all: «anecdotally [those with 
hyperphantasia] are really good at moving on […] One 
wonders whether that’s because theyre less troubled by 
the kinds of images which, for many of us, come to 
mind». Cf. also A. ZEMAN, M. DEWAR, S. DELLA SALA, 
Lives without imagery – congenital aphantasia; B. FAW, 
Conflicting intuitions may be based on differing abilities 
– Evidence from mental imagining research. 
7 Cf. Y. OGINI, H. NEMOTO, K. INUI, S. SAITO, R. 
KAKIGI, F. GOTO, Inner experience of pain: Imagination 
of pain while viewing images showing painful events 
forms subjective pain representation in human brain. 
8 Cf. M. DI TELLA, L. CASTELLI, Alexithymia in chronic 
pain disorders. 
9 Cf. S.N. RAJA, D.B. CARR, M. COHEN, N.B. FINNERUP, 
H. FLOR, S. GIBSON, F. KEEFE, J.S. MOGIL, M. 
RINGKAMP, K.A. SLUKA, X.-J. SONG, B. STEVENS, M.D. 
SULLIVAN, P.R. TUTELMAN, T. USHIDA, K. VADER, The 
revised International Association for the Study of Pain 
definition of pain: Concepts, challenges, and compromises 
– emphasis added. 
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